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the underlying political economy of violence with a view to 
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Sudan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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legitimacy of public authority, identity politics, 
economic drivers of the conflict, civicness and 
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Front cover picture: The UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura opening the Syria peace talks 
in Geneva in January 2017. Behind him he chose to have two Syrian women. A member of the Civil 
Society Support Room and a member of the Women Advisory Board. On his right sat the government 
delegation and on his left sat the  opposition delegation, both not showing in this picture. Photo 
credit: Sputnik International. 
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Over	the	years,	both	in	Afghanistan	and	in	Syria,	I	have	seen	the	substantial	
impact	on	peace	building	by	civil	society,	and	in	particular	women.	This	has	been	
especially	useful	recently	in	the	establishment	of	the	Civil	Society	Support	Room	
and	the	Women	Advisory	Board	in	the	context	of	the	Syrian	political	process.	The	
advice,	creative	ideas	and	approaches	I	received	were	invaluable. 		
	Staffan	de	Mistura,	former	UN	Special	Envoy	to	Syria 
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to express our great appreciation to everyone who helped us in collecting the papers, background materials 
and data for this research. This includes the CSSR participants in the survey, the interviews and the focus group who 
provided us with a wealth of ideas and plenty of their time. We are particularly grateful for the help provided by Mr Alladin 
Zayyat, who took upon himself to collect and archive the documents of the CSSR including its internal reports, 
recommendations, evaluations and communications. Assistance provided by Sami Hadaya in conducting interviews, and 
by Sohaib AL Zoubi in convening the focus group is greatly appreciated. Help provided by Hani Jesri in designing the 
questionnaire is greatly valued. Feedback given by members of OSE, swisspeace, and Noref on the design of the 
questionnaire was very helpful.  
We are also grateful to the members of the OSE who answered our interviews questions and engaged with us 
constructively in conducting this research, and especially to Salvatore Pedula, the OSE member in charge of coordinating 
the CSSR who engaged with us in providing needed background information and helped us to disseminate the initial 
findings of our research which increased its impact. We would like to thank Staffan de Mistura who granted us a meeting 
with him to discuss our initial findings and answered our questions on the impact of CSSR and for agreeing to speak at the 
launch event of this research.  
 
 
  
4         A process in its own right 
 
 
Contents 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 
1 INTRODUCTION 7 
2 THE CASE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY INCLUSION 8 
3 BACKGROUND TO THE CSSR: FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION 9 
3.1 Who Participates in the CSSR? 10 
4 THE MULTIPLE IMPACTS OF THE CSSR 11 
4.1 Peacebuilding Effects: Breaking Barriers and Finding Common Ground 11 
4.2 Influencing the Political Process: facing deadlock and signposting the way forward 12 
4.3 Facilitating Humanitarian and Operational Impacts on the ground 15 
4.4 Positive Impact of Women’s Involvement 15 
5 PERSPECTIVES ON DESIGN: OPPORTUNITIES & CHALLENGES 16 
5.1 The Importance of Ownership 16 
5.2 Design Obstacles 18 
5.3 Mandate, Link to Political Process, and Ideal Role 18 
5.4 Views on legitimacy and representation: participant selection 19 
5.5 Agenda-Setting and Topics for Discussion 21 
5.6 Format and Facilitation: A space for dialogue among Syrians 22 
5.7 Supporting consensus on foundational principles and shared values 22 
5.8 Outreach and Education 23 
6 WHERE INCLUSION FAILS: KURDISH REPRESENTATION AT THE CSSR 23 
7 REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 
 
 
 
5         A process in its own right 
 
Executive Summary  
 
This study investigates the Syrian Civil Society Support 
Room (CSSR), the first formal mechanism to involve civil 
society in the United Nations-led Syrian political talks in 
Geneva. Through a survey, interviews and focus groups, 
the research explored the impact and design of the CSSR. 
It was done primarily from the perspective of CSSR 
participants themselves but also involved interviews and 
discussions with members of the UN Office of the Special 
Envoy (OSE) team. The results provide insight into the 
value of inclusive civil society mechanisms formally 
linked to track I negotiations and the report considers the 
key design elements that can optimize the impact of the 
CSSR moving forward.   
  
The CSSR was established under the leadership of the 
third UN Special Envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura. This 
was after years of active lobbying by Syrian civil society 
calling for an independent role in the political process. It 
began as a small unstructured meeting with 12 
participants, mainly men representing the views of the 
opposition. It gradually evolved into a more structured 
mechanism that enabled more than 500 members of 
Syrian civil society, one third of them women, including 
Syrian experts and technocrats, to play an advisory role to 
the UN Special Envoy and his team, and provide input into 
the broader political process. As a novel approach to 
rendering political talks more inclusive, the CSSR’s flexible 
architecture was capable of adapting and responding to 
recommendations by its participants, generating a sense 
of ownership while also improving its design over time. 
While it still requires further improvement, the CSSR can 
be seen as a qualified success with positive impacts on 
multiple levels, even beyond intended ones.   
 
What emerges from the research is that the CSSR is 
more than a complementary advisory mechanism that 
helped enrich the UN-led political process and has added 
value independent of its impact on negotiations between 
the government and the opposition. Eighty-one per cent 
of respondents, for example, reported that CSSR 
participation helped to break barriers and converge 
conflicting viewpoints. Participating in the CSSR was a 
transformative process that fostered dialogue and 
deliberation among civic actors across social, ethnic and 
geographic divides over time to jointly analyse realities 
and soften hard-line positions, engage in collective 
problem-solving, and foster consensus on shared 
principles and inclusive pathways forward.  As such, the 
findings support the conclusions of other studies that 
civic inclusion processes can create new opportunities 
for citizen engagement, allowing multiple perspectives to 
develop a shared vision, shape priorities, generate agenda 
items and potentially legitimise an agreement.  In this 
way, it can help to address the original drivers of the 
conflict. 
 
Given the visible gridlock at the political level, taking part 
in the CSSR unsurprisingly reduced confidence in the 
track I negotiations and its delegations. It did not help 
generate trust in the political process and the political 
actors but it did increase trust among participants 
themselves. For the mediator, it provided a countervailing 
account of the conflict to those presented by the regime 
and opposition and their external backers. It proved that 
Syrians from different backgrounds can come together 
while also questioning prevailing sectarian narratives of 
the war and highlighting key areas of possible agreement. 
With the track I process stalling and the negotiating 
parties refusing to sit with one another, the CSSR rose in 
prominence and became akin to a track II process. It 
allowed the interests, needs and preferences of diverse 
communities on the ground to be expressed while also 
creating space for building constituencies of change 
across dividing lines to engage in consensus-building. 
Through the opportunities it provided to network with 
other relevant external actors, the CSSR helped deepen 
the understanding of the underlying drivers of conflict 
while also, at times, facilitating some positive action on 
the ground, including humanitarian access, temporary 
ceasefires, and negotiated evacuations. In general, 
women were more positive than men in their responses 
on the impact of participating in CSSR on bridging 
perspectives, breaking stereotypes and reducing 
prejudice as well as more positive of its impact on the 
broader political process. 
 
In Syria, a key question is how to preserve and build a 
pluralistic democratic Syria where citizens from all 
backgrounds feel protected. The CSSR became a space 
for civic actors from different backgrounds, geographies, 
and perspectives to meet and challenge themselves and 
the dominant narratives that sustain conflict and shape 
international action. The process of coming together, 
despite deep mistrust among some members and 
clashing perspectives, to deliberate on key issues and 
principles could be described as a form of ‘pre-figurative 
politics’ or re-imagining of the social contract in a non-
violent manner. The findings underscore the importance 
of inclusive mechanisms designed to promote dialogue 
and reasoned deliberation to forge a consensus around a 
shared vision, one that can foster social cohesion and 
create the conditions to align stakeholders behind the 
public interest and the foundational principles that can 
underpin a legitimate settlement.  The close link of the 
CSSR to official processes was critical for legitimating 
and elevating the role of civil society in peace-making and 
peace-building. However, a critical area where CSSR 
failed on inclusivity is on having a balanced 
representation of Syrian Kurds. 
 
One important thing that emerged in the research is the 
strong feeling of ownership most participants had of the 
CSSR. Many do not perceive it as a top-down initiative but 
as a mechanism they lobbied for and earned. They were 
not passive users or beneficiaries of the CSSR. This led to 
a positive, more proactive and engaged attitude by 
participants. At one point, some even exercised the use or 
threat of boycotting meetings as a tool to be heard. Many 
desired and demanded more visibility for the work of the 
CSSR and the recommendations they produced.   
 
 
The study explores in detail all the design elements of the 
CSSR and the ways to improve them in Section 5. Eighty 
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percent of respondents want the CSSR to continue even if 
the peace talks fail, and most of them they would like the 
OSE to continue to manage the CSSR. They believe that 
CSSR helped to create an inclusive civic framework 
through which Syrian civil society could play a larger role 
in the future.  
 
We developed our recommendations believing that it 
would be a missed opportunity not to build on the 
achievements of the CSSR and that other peace 
processes could learn from the CSSR experience.  
 
 
General findings and recommendations on civil society 
inclusion in any peace-making process 
1. From the very start of any peace-making initiative, 
formally mandate and design a civil society track 
that is linked to official negotiation processes but is 
valued as a process in its own right.  
  
2. Understand how civil society inclusion can support 
the work of mediators by signposting the way 
forward on key issues and areas of agreement while 
also by providing a third countervailing narrative.   
 
3. Capitalize on the ability of inclusion mechanisms to 
increase connectivity between policy level and 
grassroots levels, providing for improved analysis of 
the changing dynamics and perceptions that can 
affect the prospects for peace-making while also 
facilitating humanitarian action.    
 
4. When designing inclusion mechanisms, start with a 
broad conception of civil society and extend 
inclusion beyond formally constituted CSOs. It is an 
ideal platform to include those with technical 
expertise in the country in order to feed into effective 
analyses of key topics while promoting productive 
dialogue on them.   
 
5. Develop flexible and iterative processes that involve 
participants in the design, agenda development, and 
outreach in order to promote local ownership, 
transparency, and consensus-building.    
 
 
Key findings and recommendations for the CSSR 
 
1. It is important to continue the CSSR and build and 
capitalise on its valuable achievements to:   
a. increase the peacebuilding impact of the 
CSSR as a space for dialogue across conflict 
divides and engaging in collective problem-
solving, and building consensus on shared 
principles and pathways forward, 
b. support the role of the UN Special Envoy in 
mediation, 
c. facilitate conflict analysis and humanitarian 
action on the ground.  
 
2. CSSR activities should not be limited to running 
concurrently with political talks. This created huge 
discontinuities in progress and reduced the potential 
cumulative of the impact of CSSR.  
 
3. There is a need for a stronger mandate to include 
women and civil society through a UN Security 
Council Resolution, one that can provide for a 
mechanism akin to a track II process, to allow it to 
meet more frequently and develop a longer-term 
approach that can build on achievements and meet 
the varied objectives desired by civil society.  
 
4. The CSSR should provide input into a constitutional 
committee, if established, given its ability to promote 
consensus-building on foundational issues, which 
will be needed to underpin any constitutional 
process.  The CSSR can also be seen as a 
mechanism to widen participation in the 
constitutional process.  
 
5. Given the value that all participants placed on the 
CSSR for the opportunity it provided to create an 
inclusive civic framework to shape the future of 
Syria, it is important to leverage the CSSR and invest 
in its potential to provide the foundation or backbone 
for a larger national dialogue process. 
 
6. Aligning the participation criteria to the selection 
priorities chosen by participants can help undermine 
the sectarian narratives that inform and shape the 
conflict and international responses.  These priorities 
are commitment to human rights, and the ability to 
express the priorities of civilians.  The least 
important criteria they cited was sectarian and ethnic 
identity.  
 
7. To widen the impact of the CSSR, create and support 
mechanisms to ensure improved outreach and 
transparency. 
 
8. Reinforcing and scaling up the participation in the 
CSSR, including from the Kurdish Syrian civil society, 
can help combat or balance the geopolitical rivalries 
and extensive forces to meet demands for a Syrian-
led solution and support locally-led approaches to 
peace.   
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1 Introduction  
 
The conflict in Syria began with civic protests in March 
2011 demanding rights, freedom and dignity that evolved 
into massive demonstrations by mid-year. Fuelled by 
long-standing grievances against the regime’s repression 
and kleptocratic rule, the Syrian uprising called for 
fundamental changes in the relationship between the 
government and the governed. The regime’s subsequent 
violent reaction to quell the initially peaceful and unarmed 
demonstrations contributed to the transformation of the 
civil uprising into an armed rebellion. As the conflict 
became increasingly militarized and more complex with 
intensifying external involvement, the violence soon 
mutated into a full-scale civil war intertwined with a 
regional and international proxy war that has been 
increasingly narrated and interpreted through sectarian 
lenses. Eight years into the war, the conflict has claimed 
more than half a million lives, produced more than 5.6 
million refugees, and internally displaced nearly seven 
million people.  
 
The extreme violence of the Syrian war, and how it has 
been represented has shifted attention from the civic 
roots of the Syrian uprising and the underlying drivers of 
conflict. Although complex and multi-layered, the conflict 
is often portrayed as a struggle between two sides - the 
regime and the armed opposition. This portrayal is flawed 
not least because the protagonists themselves are 
fragmented with the regime dependent on several 
external parties with differing agendas for its survival and 
an opposition with many components, each itself 
supported by foreign actors with diverse agendas. 
Importantly, however, such binary narratives have 
effectively worked to silence civic voices and render 
invisible the rich diversity of experiences and perspectives 
of Syrian citizens that could help deepen understanding 
of drivers and solutions to the ongoing conflict. For 
armed parties, these narratives strengthen their power 
and authority as they claim to authentically represent 
their constituencies while keeping communities divided, 
afraid and engaged in zero-sum politics. As a result, 
spaces for citizens and civil society to collaborate, 
network, and work together across conflict and spatial 
divides have narrowed dramatically.  
 
The quick shift in the conflict’s narrative, from a civil 
                                                        
1 For more information on the Women’s Advisory Board, 
please see https://bit.ly/31BLymH 
uprising that unified Syrians in their quest for political and 
economic change to a sectarian civil war pitting 
community against community, has shaped international 
and local attitudes and threatened the prospects for a 
peaceful and pluralistic Syria. The escalation of the 
conflict by external actors, who focused more on arming 
the opposition, weakened civic elements of the 
opposition and contributed to the sectarianisation of the 
conflict. This fed into strategies used by the regime and 
some of the increasingly well-armed jihadi groups able to 
marshal war-making resources to control different 
geographies. Many efforts by the United Nations (UN) 
and other actors to negotiate an end to the war with the 
main conflict parties have started, stalled and failed. 
Today, even as violence subsides and the Syrian regime 
claims ‘victory’, a newly appointed UN Special Envoy, Geir 
Pederson, is attempting to re-start political talks this year. 
 
Amidst this grim picture is the persistence of Syrian civil 
society and the work of the Civil Society Support Room, 
established under the leadership of Staffan de Mistura, 
the third UN Special Envoy for Syria. The Civil Society 
Support Room (CSSR) is the first formal mechanism to 
involve civil society in UN-led intra-Syrian talks, an 
initiative developed after years of active lobbying by 
Syrian civil society for an independent role. Alongside the 
establishment of the CSSR, a Women’s Advisory Board 
consisting of 12 Syrian women from different 
backgrounds (WAB) was also formed as a result of the 
calls from Syrian women organisations which were met 
by a receptive and willing Special Envoy.1  
 
As a novel approach to rendering talks more inclusive, the 
CSSR process has not been without its challenges or its 
detractors but it can be seen as a qualified success by 
legitimating civil society and increasing its influence while 
slowly diluting and breaking dominant representations of 
the conflict. Indeed, the impact of the CSSR on Syrian civil 
society not only questions prevailing sectarian narratives 
of the war, providing evidence that Syrians from different 
backgrounds can come together, it has also created 
space for constituencies of change across divided 
communities to develop a shared vision for a future Syria. 
Importantly, as the track I negotiations stalled with the 
opposition and government parties refusing to sit with 
one another, the CSSR (and the WAB) assumed the 
‘undeclared role’ of creating track II processes to express 
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the interests, needs and preference of diverse 
communities on the ground (Albouzi, 2017, p.2), while 
signposting the way forward on the critical issues that 
need to be addressed as well as the possible areas of 
agreement.  
 
This paper presents and analyses findings of ongoing 
research conducted by the Conflict and Civil Society 
Research Unit at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE). The research involved an online 
survey of 118 CSSR participants, focus groups, 
interviews, secondary sources, and discussions with 
policy-makers. The online survey included 28 questions in 
Arabic designed to capture the impact of the CSSR on 
those who have participated, and to elicit their 
perspectives on specific design elements of the CSSR 
and how best to improve it moving forward. The LSE 
team sought external advice and the input of key 
members of the CSSR in the design of the survey 
questionnaire as well as soliciting feedback from the UN 
Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) and its implementing 
partners, swisspeace and NOREF.  Moreover, the team 
previewed some of the survey findings at a meeting of 
the CSSR in Geneva in November 2018 and at the LSE 
conference in December 2018.     
 
2 The case for civil society inclusion 
 
Dominant approaches to peace-making usually involve a 
narrow set of actors, often armed and male, meeting 
behind closed doors to negotiate a peace deal to end the 
conflict. Until recently, negotiators and mediators have 
tended to prefer smaller negotiating tables and favour the 
exclusion of civil society from peace negotiations, 
believing it unnecessarily complicates efforts to reach an 
agreement and can undermine the durability of an 
agreement. Indeed, only one-third of peace agreements 
between 1989 and 2004 had some kind of involvement 
from civil society, whether through direct or indirect 
inclusion (Nilsson 2012).   
 
While there has been a surge in negotiated peace 
settlements since the 1980s, practice and research have 
demonstrated the fragility of peace agreements. World 
Bank figures indicate that more than 50 per cent of all 
peace agreements fail and violence resumes within five 
years of signature (WDR 2011). This failure is often 
explained by the narrowness of peace agreements, able 
to end violence and buy peace among armed actors in 
the short-term but unable to address the drivers of 
violence and its effects in the long-term. Recent efforts to 
include women and civil society have become part of an 
increasingly global movement, backed by UN Security 
Council Resolutions (1325, 2419 and 2282) and a growing 
body of research that strongly indicates that peace 
settlements are more durable when they involve a fuller 
range of stakeholders, including: 
  
• A 2008 study of 25 peace treaties reports a strong 
correlation between high or moderate civil society 
involvement in negotiations with sustained peace in 
the peacebuilding phase (Wanis-St. John and Kew 
2008). The study states that this holds true even 
when civil society is not at the negotiating table but 
exercises influence over the negotiations. 
Conversely, the study argues that war resumed in 
cases not characterized by direct or indirect civil 
society involvement in peace-making (2008, p.30).   
 
• A 2012 study assessing 83 peace agreements 
between 1989 and 2004 comes to similar 
conclusions and argues that civil society involvement 
in peace-making reduces the risk of peace failing by 
64 per cent (Nilsson 2012, p.258). It suggests civil 
society inclusion may be stronger under particular 
conditions, most importantly in non-democratic 
contexts, like Liberia where warring parties are more 
likely to be warlords than democratic contexts like 
South Africa, where the apartheid government and 
ANC leadership were both elected.   
 
• A 2015 study of 182 signed peace accords over two 
decades that measured the presence of women as 
negotiators, mediators, witnesses and signatories, 
showed that these accords were thirty five per cent 
more likely to last at least 15 years when women 
were involved (O’Reilly, Suilleabhain and Paffenholz 
2015).  
 
These studies, in line with dominant debates, have 
focused on the merits of civil society inclusion or 
exclusion, largely leaving aside design considerations and 
the various ways in which civil society can and should 
participate. A range of different techniques and 
modalities to increase citizen participation in peace 
processes exist, including negotiating structures created 
to permit direct and indirect access to peace talks by 
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various interest groups (e.g., Northern Ireland or 
Guatemala) or neutral advisory bodies to allow a review 
process for draft accords by marginalized groups or civil 
society (e.g., Darfur). Today, with many peace 
agreements failing and peace initiatives stalling, more 
attention has recently focused on the ‘how’ of inclusion 
and under what conditions (Paffenholz 2014).  
 
3 Background to the CSSR: From 
Exclusion to Inclusion 
 
Until 2014, UN mediation attempts focused on working 
only with the main conflict political and armed parties and 
their regional and international backers despite the active 
lobbying efforts of Syrian civil society calling for an 
inclusive process since 2012. In June 2013, these civic 
efforts culminated in a conference organised in Lebanon 
by Syrian civil society and the LSE about the strategic role 
for Syrian civil society in resolving the conflict2. The 
conference which was also attended by a member of the 
Arab League and the second UN Special Envoy, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, called for Syrian civil society ‘to play a leading 
role in presenting solutions, becoming a key partner on the 
negotiation table on all tracks and playing a role in 
decision-making on issues facing the country.’ In 2014, in 
response to lobbying by Syrian civil society organisations, 
including the organisers of the conference, UN Special 
Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi agreed to form a small diverse 
group comprised of civil society figures to act as a 
sounding board of ideas to the Special Envoy. He held a 
four-day consultation in Montreux with his team and this 
group in April 2014. The group announced itself after the 
meeting as the Syrian Peacebuilding Advisory Unit.3 While 
this represented a positive step, Syrian civil society still 
had no formal role in the political process. Despite calls 
for civil society inclusion and women’s participation in 
particular, efforts led by mediators Kofi Annan and 
Lakhdar Brahimi have been described as ‘exclusionary 
processes’ (Hellmüller and Zahar, 2019).   
  
A shift to a more inclusive process began under the 
leadership of the third UN Special Representative, Staffan 
de Mistura, who seemed to be more appreciative of the 
value of including women and civil society from the 
outset. After his appointment, members of Syrian civil 
                                                        
2 See https://bit.ly/2K9V3Eq  for more information on the 
conference  
3 See http://www.salamsyria.org  
society began lobbying him, and one group of Syrian 
organizations sent him a proposed plan outlining how 
civil society could be included in Geneva.4 The plan 
proposed the formation of a Civil Advisory Forum 
composed of members of Syrian civil society and 
coordinated by the UN. Members of the Syrian 
Peacebuilding Advisory Unit also met with the Special 
Envoy and called for a more formal and wider inclusion of 
civil society in the Geneva process and rejected the 
inclusion of women and civil society as part of the 
existing delegations of the main conflict parties. Within 
the framework of the ‘Geneva consultations’, De Mistura 
began a wide consultation process and met with a broad 
range of stakeholders, including women and civil society. 
In parallel, Syrian women organisations came together 
under the Syrian Women Initiative for Peace and 
Democracy and lobbied the UN and the Special Envoy for 
a role for women in the process. When intra-Syrian 
political talks resumed under his auspices in January 
2016, De Mistura creatively interpreted UN Security 
Council Resolution 2254, which speaks of an inclusive 
process, to institutionalize civil society’s participation in 
the political talks through the establishment of the Civil 
Society Support Room and the Women’s Advisory Board. 
 
The CSSR started with a small meeting in January 2016 
and represents a unique initiative to include civil society 
actors formally within a UN-led process in the early 
stages of peace talks. It was initially set up as a physical 
room at the Palais des Nations in Geneva to convene civil 
society actors from across conflict lines during official 
UN-led political talks, and as a space to facilitate dialogue, 
networking and advocacy among civil society and with 
the OSE mediation team, UN member states, UN 
agencies, international experts, and officials from other 
delegations. Over time, the CSSR has expanded in size 
and scope, and has included several outreach meetings in 
the region (Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan) as well as 
teleconferencing with civil society in hard-to-reach areas.   
 
It is important to note that there was significant 
resistance against the inclusion of civil society by the 
government delegation and the opposition delegation, 
4 Copy of the plan which was sent on 10 -12-2015 is available 
at: https://bit.ly/2Rkclj3 
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fearing it would undermine their positions.5 De Mistura’s 
invitation for civil society to take part in the Geneva 
process generated anxiety and even prompted the head 
of the Syrian National Coalition, which is the leading 
opposition party in Geneva, to invite Syrian CSOs in 
Turkey to a meeting to talk about ‘Syrian CSOs 
representation in the negotiations’. As one participant in a 
focus group stated, ‘the negotiating teams dislike the civil 
society room because they think that they should be the 
only representatives of the Syrian people.’ 
 
In fact, not all Syrian CSOs favoured an independent role 
in the Geneva process, and some argued for supporting 
the political opposition delegation instead through their 
inclusion within the same delegation. A group of pro-
opposition Syrian CSOs met in Gaziantep soon after the 
announcement to invite Syrian civil society to Geneva and 
issued a statement6 to declare that only civil society that 
was part of the public movement and struggle against the 
regime should be invited. Many of those who signed the 
statement eventually warmed up to the idea and became 
regular participants in CSSR with some of them became 
leading proponents of inclusion.  
 
Officially, the CSSR plays an advisory role to the UN 
Special Envoy and his team, and is not conceived as a 
third party to the talks. It is an attempt to bring civil 
society from all sides together in order to promote 
different perspectives in the talks but also, in some ways, 
to demonstrate that people from very different political 
and geographic backgrounds can sit at the same table 
together. According to UN documents, the CSSR 
specifically seeks to strengthen civil society participation 
in peace talks in six ways: (1) sharing local knowledge 
and expertise; (2) acting as prominent advocates for a 
political solution; (3) providing unique perspectives and 
insights on a range of thematic topics; (4) enhancing 
transparency of the political process; (5) expanding the 
space for a cohesive civil society in Syria; and (5) building 
the foundations for civil society participation in peace 
processes in other contexts.7   
 
The CSSR’s design as an iterative and flexible process, 
capable of adapting to changing conditions on the ground 
and to participant input on agenda restructuring, has 
                                                        
5 See for example “What is behind De Mistura’s insistence on 
including civil society in Geneva” available at 
https://bit.ly/2MJI0M6  
helped generate a sense of ownership among 
participants, even with its challenges. It began with only 
twelve participants, and expanded to include nearly 500 
civil actors from a range of backgrounds, expertise and 
geographies, but with the notable exclusion of civil 
society from Kurdish-controlled areas.     
 
The CSSR is funded by the foreign ministries of 
Switzerland, Norway and Sweden, as well as the 
European Union. It is managed jointly by swisspeace and 
the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF). 
 
3.1 Who Participates in the CSSR?  
 
The selection of participants can be crucial to creating a 
productive and inclusive dialogue and can impact the 
quality of discussion and potential peacebuilding effects 
of any civil society dialogue process. The CSSR suffered 
from several challenges that created an imbalance in 
participation especially in the first few rounds of the 
CSSR. Over time, however, as the conveners developed 
new approaches to resolve this imbalance, the CSSR 
grew to include more diverse perspectives with attention 
paid to gender and geographies within Syria and among 
those actors outside Syria.   
 
In the first few rounds of the CSSR, nearly all participants 
were male and represented only the views of the political 
opposition and those living outside of Syria. Some of the 
initial participants were reluctant to involve civil society 
from regime-controlled areas out of the belief that they 
could not hold independent views. Travel and visa 
restrictions by the regime further prevented civil society 
organizations registered in Damascus to travel to Geneva 
for the CSSR meetings. Over time, however, the CSSR 
created a demand for participation particularly among 
members of civil society who were side-lined by the 
polarized and violent landscape. As an increasing number 
of people demanded to take part, especially from 
government-controlled areas, the designers and 
managers of the CSSR built sufficient trust in the process 
to broaden participation and get the regime to ease the 
travel restrictions it imposed on some participants. The 
most significant imbalance, however, has been the 
continued exclusion of civil society operating in Kurdish-
6 Text of the statement available at: https://www.baladi-
news.com/ar/news/details/3168/ 
7 From the Q&A document provided by the OSE to participants 
of the CSSR 
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majority territory, an imbalance also reflected in the 
political talks.  
  
The OSE broadened participation through several 
approaches, including reliance on recommendations by 
INGOs and UN agencies operating with civil society, 
consultations with a wider range of activists, 
recommendations by CSSR participants themselves, and 
a rotating process and changing the list of participants.  
 
The background information reported by survey 
respondents generally reflects the make-up of the Civil 
Society Support Room, as confirmed by interviews.   
 
• Most respondents came from NGOs or organized 
sectors of civil society (74 per cent), including several 
large umbrella organizations and networks that work 
on different issues within the peacebuilding, legal, 
and humanitarian fields both inside and outside of 
Syria. Approximately 26 per cent of respondents 
participated as technical experts (e.g. law), individual 
activists, or prominent community figures.   
 
• Over half of the participants (52 per cent) were above 
the age of 40 years old, and only 16 per cent under 
the age of thirty years old. The age disparity may 
also reflect that over half (56 per cent) of the 
respondents were the leaders or heads of their 
organizations.   
 
• Approximately 67 per cent of respondents were men, 
and 33 per cent were women.  
 
Over time, the CSSR progressively involved more women, 
young people, prominent public figures and experts, 
including legal and constitutional experts, university 
professors, and former government advisors.   
 
4 The Multiple Impacts of the CSSR 
 
The results of the survey and interviews show that the 
CSSR has had impacts on multiple levels, even beyond 
the intended ones, with varying degrees of success. What 
clearly emerges from these results, however is the need 
to think about peace-making beyond a track I political 
process that includes complementary civil society role 
feeding into elite negotiations. The research 
demonstrates that the CSSR was far more than a 
complementary process to the political track. It has 
created a process in its own right and has its own value 
independent of political negotiations between the 
government and opposition delegations. It also reveals 
how participating in the CSSR was a transformative 
process that helped participants to soften their views and 
become more in favour of inclusion (see Figure 3). 
 
This makes it important to account for both policy and 
process impacts when assessing the CSSR. While any 
civil society mechanism linked to political negotiations 
may be used as a tool for achieving concrete outputs 
(e.g. thematic reports to feed into the talks) or outcomes 
at the negotiating table, many have a wider process and 
change impacts than their initial intended purpose. These 
process impacts are difficult to measure but may have a 
longer-term transformative effect by strengthening the 
capacities of society to engage in visioning and 
collaborative action, as seen in Figure 4. 
 
4.1 Peacebuilding Effects: Breaking 
Barriers and Finding Common Ground  
 
The violence and increasing sectarianisation of the 
conflict has had immense consequences for Syrian civil 
society and the conflict itself, limiting civil society’s ability 
to mobilize a broad-based movement rooted in universal 
grievances and reinforcing cycles of fear and violence. In 
Syria, sectarianism became a political tool by the regime 
and jihadi militias, as a way of ruling populations under 
their control and preventing opposition through fear and 
division.   
 
A challenge for civil society and the prospects for peace 
has been the division of the country’s society into three 
different civil societies, each perceived as associated with 
or influenced by the narrative of the political authority 
controlling their area (regime-, opposition-, or Kurdish-
controlled). While some organizations operate across 
communities, the conflict has made it increasingly 
difficult for broad-based civic movements to survive and 
mobilize across conflict divides. This has been 
accentuated by both external and internal narratives that 
describe the conflict in broad geopolitical or sectarian 
terms, which renders invisible the agency and diverse 
interests of civic Syrian actors.   
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The survey found that the greatest impact of the CSSR 
was on participants and civil society itself, helping to 
strengthen their role and influence. In contrast to the 
delegations at the political negotiations, civil society from 
different geographies and perspectives were able to sit 
together and debate critical issues, even if discussions 
became acrimonious at many times. According to 
respondents, the process of coming together helped 
dilute binary narratives, break stereotypes of the ‘other’, 
and expand opportunities for dialogue and networking 
across conflict lines. Participants interviewed reported 
that many found it initially difficult to be in the same room 
with those who held different views on the conflict or  
 
lived in geographies controlled by the opponent. As one 
CSSR participant remarked at the LSE conference, 
  
‘It was challenging at first for all participants to put 
aside their political positions in order to envision 
together a peaceful future for Syria. There was 
tendency to blame others for everything that has 
happened. There was also a prevailing atmosphere of 
deep distrust and conspiratorial thinking with 
participants questioning the legitimacy of others in the 
room.’ 
 
As seen in Figure 2, a majority of respondents (81 per 
cent) reported that CSSR participation was able to break 
barriers and converge conflicting viewpoints, with only 4 
per cent stating it resulted in divergent opinions. As one 
participant stated, ‘the most important impact was 
connecting Syrians from different areas and with different 
viewpoints’ while another noted, ‘before [the CSSR], we 
didn’t have a way to do so… [even if] we already believed 
that we had to work with civil society across conflict lines’. 
 
4.2 Influencing the Political Process: facing 
deadlock and signposting the way 
forward 
 
While most respondents did not believe that participation 
in the CSSR significantly impacted the political process or 
helped generate public trust in the process, they pointed 
to the progress the CSSR made in signposting the way 
forward on key issues by demonstrating the possibilities 
for consensus-building and areas of agreements. Overall, 
as seen in Figure 1,, only 26 per cent of respondents 
agreed with the statement that the CSSR has had a direct 
and constructive impact on political talks, with half 
strongly disagreeing with it (50 per cent). Similarly, 46 per 
cent did not believe that the CSSR influenced the agenda 
and outputs of the talks, while 29 per cent did. Not one 
respondent believed that the CSSR contributed to 
creating an environment of trust among negotiating 
parties.   
Figure 1 participants’ views on the impact of CSSR on peace talks 
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These results are unsurprising given the political 
deadlock between the negotiating parties. Although the 
Syrian conflict parties may have accepted UN mediation 
and participation in the Geneva process, structured as 
‘proximity talks’, they did so purely pro forma and were 
never willing to enter into substantive negotiations. 
Representatives of the conflict parties consistently 
refused to sit down together beyond the opening of intra-
Syrian talks, and the UN mediator, unable to convince 
them to directly engage with one another, held separate 
talks with the regime and opposition delegations.   
 
Even so, participants believed that their participation in 
the CSSR helped them re-shape the narratives that have 
informed the way in which the UN and external actors 
perceive the conflict and shape the political process. In 
contrast to the political parties, the CSSR made 
significant progress bringing together those across 
dividing lines to build consensus on key challenges and to 
substantively debate some of the key elements that could 
shape the prospects for peace; in this way, signposting 
the way forward on potential areas of agreements. In the 
survey, nearly half (49 per cent) reported that they 
believed they influenced the discourse of the UN Special 
Envoy and other country representatives, while over 61 
per cent agreed with the statement that the CSSR helped 
end the monopoly of representation by negotiating 
actors, and their monopoly of political process (Figure 1). 
Moreover, 61 per cent credit the CSSR for providing the 
space for civil society to express the voices of citizens 
who have been marginalized by the political process 
(Figure 1).   
 
Furthermore, in interviews and focus groups, participants 
highlighted how the inclusion of legal and constitutional 
experts in the CSSR played an important role in the 
political track through their valuable input on 
constitutional change. One participant said: 
‘The groups of CSSR members who worked on the 
constitution provided a paper on the constitutional 
options that are available for Syria, which was 
submitted to the Special Envoy. They discussed the 
different alternatives and options such as drafting a 
new constitution based either on the 1950 constitution, 
or the 2012 one, or declaring a provisional 
constitution.’  
 
Interviews at the OSE confirm these participant 
perspectives, and highlight how the CSSR deepened the 
Special Envoy’s understanding of realities on the ground, 
civilian perspectives and desires, and contributed to 
changes in his approach to the political process. Indeed, 
in our correspondence with the UN Special Envoy, De 
Mistura stated, ‘over the years, both in Afghanistan and in 
Syria, I have seen the substantial impact on peace building 
by civil society, and in particular women. This has been 
especially useful recently in the establishment of the Civil 
Society Support Room and the Women Advisory Board in 
the context of the Syrian political process. The advice, 
creative ideas and approaches I received were invaluable.’ 
  
Figure 2: participants' views on the CSSR's ability to 
break barriers and converge views 
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OSE team members also emphasised how the CSSR was 
considered an important player in Geneva and was valued 
by many actors, including the Humanitarian Task Force 
and the Ceasefire task force, as well as the delegations of 
member states who participate in Geneva. Indeed, some 
of the recommendations and discussions with Syrian civil 
society were reflected in the periodic briefings of the UN 
Special Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, to the United Nation’s 
Security Council.8  
  
For Syrian respondents, participation in the Geneva 
process through the CSSR reduced confidence in the 
political talks and the negotiation parties but it increased 
trust and respect among participants, and their belief in 
the important role that an inclusive civil society can play 
in peace-making and peace-building. As one respondent 
wrote,  
‘I was surprised how easily the different participants 
accepted each other, opposite to what happens at the 
political tracks.’   
Respondents valued participation in the CSSR for the 
opportunity it provided to elevate and legitimate the role 
of an inclusive civil society in the peace process through 
                                                        
8 De Mistura mentioned the meetings with civil society and 
some of their recommendations in his briefings at the Security 
Council in June 2017, August 2017, September 2017 and 
November 2017.  Please see 
https://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-
statements/27062017/syria; 
https://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-
statements/30082017/syria; 
bridge-building, creating empathy and respect for 
difference, and deepening their own understanding of the 
importance of a civil society that is inclusive of different 
https://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-
statements/27092017/syria; 
https://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-
statements/27112017/syria.  
 
 
Figure 3 participants' views on the impact of participating in the CSSR 
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perspectives and geographies. They credited the CSSR 
with creating the space for a divided civil society to build 
trust and respect, and develop the relationships that can 
push the boundaries of the conflict lines (see Figure 4).  
The CSSR can be seen as allowing a fragmented civil 
society to carve out more self-consciously autonomous 
spaces to help generate conditions for a different type of 
politics: when asked about the different impacts of the 
CSSR, most participants agreed (68 per cent) with the 
statement that it ‘formed an opportunity to create an 
inclusive Syrian civic framework through which the Syrian 
civil society could play a bigger and more constructive role 
in the future’ (see Figure 1). In this way, the CSSR’s direct 
link to the political process helped to legitimize a role for 
civil society as an actor in a broader political process that 
supports but goes beyond its impact on elite 
negotiations. It created multiple opportunities for Syrian 
civil society with diverse views to build bridges and 
substantively think through some of the key elements 
that could preserve and shape a pluralistic, democratic 
Syria in the future.   
 
4.3 Facilitating Humanitarian and 
Operational Impacts on the ground 
 
Minimal UN presence in Syria, combined with the 
difficulty of civil society networks to work across conflict-
divides (geographic, sectarian, ethnic, etc.), has not only 
hampered humanitarian efforts on the ground but it also 
has limited effective conflict analyses and allowed the 
main conflict parties to dominate representations of the 
conflict.   
 
The CSSR provided an opportunity for external 
engagement with a broader spectrum of Syrian society 
beyond armed actors with vested interests in limiting 
access to activists, dissenting voices, and potential 
constituencies for change. The survey found that CSSR 
participation helped thicken contacts and networks 
between civil society and with relevant international 
actors and delegations, including the UN’s Humanitarian 
Task Force, the Ceasefire Task Force and members of 
the so-called International Syria Support Group (ISSG) in 
which all relevant international and regional actors, 
including Iran, were represented. Several participants 
cited examples in which contacts made through the 
CSSR helped facilitate positive action on the ground, 
including humanitarian access, temporary ceasefires, and 
negotiated evacuations. One suggested, ‘the UN can’t  
work without our knowledge’ but it also ‘proved helpful for 
us to operate in various sites of the country now that we 
know we have colleagues across different areas.’ Yet, 
given the level of atrocities committed in the country, 
many respondents felt that these positive examples were 
few and raised expectations that could not be met. While 
only 41 per cent believe the CSSR helped facilitate 
humanitarian action on the ground, 75 per cent of those 
under 40 felt it positively impacted humanitarian action 
on the ground. This could be explained by the fact that 
younger participants tend to be more connected to the 
ground. As one respondent stated, ‘CSSR impact was 
more direct on humanitarian issues, ceasefires, and 
humanitarian access than on political talks’. 
 
4.4 Positive Impact of Women’s 
Involvement 
 
Integrating a gender dimension into the political process 
was the mandate of the Women’s Advisory Board rather 
than the Civil Society Support Room, although both 
groups networked with one another and some of their 
members overlapped. However, it is interesting to note 
that the survey found significant differences between the 
perspectives of male and female participants in the 
CSSR. Overall, women were more positive than men 
about the CSSR and its potential impacts both on civil 
society itself and on the broader political process. For 
example, women are: 
• 25 per cent more likely to say that the CSSR had a 
significant impact in bridging perspectives; 
• 27 per cent more likely to say that the CSSR helped 
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break stereotypes and reduce prejudice; 
• 55 per cent more likely to say that CSSR increased 
networking between those who do not normally 
interact; 
• 71 per cent more likely to say that CSSR was able to 
communicate the voices and sufferings of those 
civilians absent from the peace process; 
• 52 per cent more likely to say that the CSSR 
contributed to breaking the monopoly of the political 
process, and monopoly of representation by 
negotiating actors; 
• 50 per cent less likely to say that the CSSR enhanced 
trust in the negotiating parties. 
 
Further research is needed to unpack these findings, but 
some suggested that the previous exclusion of women 
on political issues, combined with the fact that the direct 
talks are currently dominated by men, make them more 
willing to engage in the political process.   
 
5 Perspectives on Design: 
Opportunities & Challenges  
 
The design of any inclusion mechanism is a complex 
political, psychological and technical process that must 
reflect local realities such as political culture, institutional 
                                                        
9 A copy of all the CSSR internal reports is available at 
https://bit.ly/2WAci3r 
weakness, and level of exclusion of different groups. 
Designers and conveners inevitably face difficult choices 
with regard to participation, design and objectives, which 
are often inseparable from the political dynamics in the 
country but also important in order to optimize civil 
society’s impact and influence on peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. Process design is fundamental as it can 
either enable or constrain the ability of civil society actors 
to build consensus, exercise influence, create coalitions 
for change based on normative and strategic arguments, 
and raise the critical issues that need to be addressed for 
sustainable peacebuilding.    
We asked participants views on the design of the CSSR 
and how they would like to see it in the future.  
 
5.1 The Importance of Ownership  
 
Strengthening a sense of collective ownership among 
participants is often difficult but important for legitimizing 
the process and outcomes of any inclusive mechanism. 
An important element that emerged from interviews, and 
reviews of CSSR reports and self-evaluations is the 
strong feeling of ownership most participants had of the 
CSSR. Many do not perceive it as a top-down initiative but 
as a mechanism they lobbied for and earned. This 
created a positive, more proactive attitude by participants 
who took upon themselves to produce their own internal 
reports of the CSSR meetings9 as well as to organise their 
own evaluation exercises between rounds and propose 
Figure 4 participants’ responses on the CSSR’s most important achievements 
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new ideas for the design. Going through the 
correspondence between members of the OSE and the 
CSSR members who initiated the evaluations, we 
observed how some of the ideas they proposed were 
taken onboard in the design of the future rounds. One 
example is the idea of holding regional CSSR meetings 
such as in Turkey and Lebanon in order to improve the 
CSSR’s inclusivity and to create opportunities for 
participation by those unable to travel to Geneva. 
Members also played a role in choosing methods of 
facilitation and at times they facilitated their own 
meetings.  
 
Participants were not passive users or beneficiaries of the 
CSSR, and at one point, some even exercised the use or 
threat of boycotting meetings as a tool to be heard. One 
example that stands out was in November 2017 when 
Syrian CSOs received invites to participate in a CSSR 
meeting to be held later that month. Ten Syrian CSOs 
responded by issuing a public statement complaining 
that their previous recommendations on design and 
substance had not been integrated into the process: 
 
‘The results of the discussions that took place during 
                                                        
10 Full text of statement available at: https://bit.ly/31tIwRv 
previous CSSR meetings were not fully reflected in the 
periodic briefings of the UN Special Envoy, Mr. Staffan 
de Mistura, to the United Nation’s Security 
Council…The topics of the meetings of the Civil Society 
Support Room are chosen in a manner that is not 
systematic. This process lacks a specific methodology 
that follows up on, builds upon, deepens and 
addresses previous discussions. In addition, the 
invitations are not based on clear work programs for 
the meetings, but rather on general titles for the 
different issues.’10 
 
While emphasizing their commitment to supporting the 
Geneva process and ‘the importance of participation of 
civil society’, they declined the invitation and provided a 
number of further suggestions on how to improve the 
process and its outputs. Although they did not attend the 
November 2017 meeting, they accepted an invitation by 
the OSE team to come and discuss their concerns, and 
continued to participate within the CSSR at later stages.  
 
Their position echoes some of the views raised by some 
participants in our focus groups who felt that threatening 
to boycott meetings could be used as a tool for pressure.  
Figure 5: Participants’ views on the most significant obstacles 
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While these attitudes could be interpreted as negative, 
participants suggest that they actually reflect the 
ownership they felt over the CSS and the value they 
placed on their participation and ideas for improvement. 
Many desired and demanded more visibility for the work 
of the CSSR and the recommendations they produced.   
 
5.2 Design Obstacles   
 
Many of the obstacles cited by participants in the survey 
related to the design of the process including selection of 
participants, the presence of political and military actors 
and a rotating participant list; as well as the lack of 
support and outreach mechanisms to prepare 
participants and allow them to build on the achievements 
in the room (see Figure 5).  
 
A key question for this research is how can a UN-
mandated civil society process be designed to support 
and strengthen the prospects for peace that go beyond a 
simple need to demonstrate inclusivity and participation. 
Research into the Civil Society Support Room provided an 
important opportunity to think through the ways in which 
greater inclusivity could be achieved from the perspective 
of civil society itself, specifically those who have already 
participated in and helped shape the CSSR. Questions 
asked of participants focused on the role that the CSSR 
should play, its relationship to the political process, and 
the key design elements that could enable it to be a 
productive space for civil society.   
In analysing survey findings, we identified several key 
design elements that effects the functioning and impact 
of civil society inclusion processes, including but not 
limited to: (1) mandate and link to broader political 
process; (2) management and support structures; (3) 
criteria for participation; (4) rules and format; (5) agenda 
setting and topics for discussion; and, (6) outreach and 
education. 
 
5.3 Mandate, Link to Political Process, and 
Ideal Role 
 
Civil society inclusion processes must be closely linked to 
broader political processes in order to strengthen their 
legitimacy and overall effectiveness. One-off initiatives to 
convene civil society may infuse new energy in the short-
term, but transformative processes normally require long-
term engagement and support. A continuous UN-
mandated process directly linked to the Office of the 
Figure 7: Participants’ views on who should 
manage the process 
Figure 6: Participants’ views on continuing the CSSR 
even if peace talks stop 
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Special Envoy is widely seen by those surveyed as 
legitimating and strengthening the role that civil society 
can play in both peace-making and reconstruction 
processes. Nearly two thirds of participants surveyed felt 
it should continue to operate under the auspices of the 
United Nations (Figure 6).  
 
The mandate of the Civil Society Support Room, however, 
has been interpreted as confined to operating when 
political talks are held or ongoing, rather than a more 
expansive role such as an ongoing track II process that 
can feed into a broader political process and support a 
longer-term transformative process. Nearly 80 per cent of 
participants surveyed believed it very important for the 
CSSR to continue even in the absence of political talks 
(see Figure 7).   
 
In their response to the question on the ideal role that the 
CSSR should play, respondents favoured a variety of roles 
to influence peace-making and longer-term peacebuilding 
that went beyond direct inclusion in political negotiations 
as either third party actors or mediators. They saw the 
value of the CSSR as an independent platform for civil 
society to influence the political process and those tasked 
with mediating it, while shaping larger transformation 
processes and ground-level dynamics in the country. As 
seen in Figure 8, the three most critical roles chosen as 
‘very important’ were as a mechanism to express citizen 
perspectives and raising critical issues (95 per cent); to 
mobilize international pressure on the armed parties (78 
per cent); to provide expertise (78 per cent) and to 
monitor the process (76 per cent). In contrast, less than 
half saw the role of the CSSR as a mediator between 
parties or as a direct third party actor at the negotiating 
table as ‘very important’.   
 
5.4 Views on legitimacy and 
representation: participant selection 
 
Designers and conveners often seek to select participants 
in such a way so as to either represent different groups 
within society or ensure a diverse range of interests, 
views and perspectives. Broadly speaking, two 
contrasting approaches to participant selection can be 
identified in dialogue processes: representative or 
targeted selection. Representative participation means 
applying quotas to ensure that specific proportions of 
society are represented. In contrast to ‘percentage 
focused’ representation approaches, targeted 
participation may focus on specific stakeholder groups 
(e.g. peacebuilding CSOs), thematic experts, or individuals 
of prominent standing in order ensure a diversity of views, 
interests and perspectives.   
Figure 8: Participants' views on the ideal role of the CSSR 
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The conveners of the CSSR took a mixed approach to 
address the issue of imbalanced gender and 
geographical representation while also targeting specific 
groups, such as peacebuilding NGOs, humanitarian 
organizations, and umbrella networks, and to a lesser  
 
extent, prominent figures, including legal and 
constitutional experts, university professors, and former 
government advisors. Their approaches to widen 
participation were viewed as partially successful while 
raising other challenges. For example, 62 per cent of 
participants surveyed believed that regional meetings 
improved participation and inclusion but nearly half of 
respondents (49 per cent) reported that regularly and 
substantially changing the list of participants created a 
challenge of continuity in discussions. Some have 
suggested this challenge could have been off-set by other 
mechanisms to encourage prior networking and 
commitment to outreach. 
 
For Syrian participants, the question of ‘who is 
representative’ overlapped with perceptions of ‘who is 
legitimate’ and raised a number of concerns, not least 
because the Syrian conflict has geographically divided 
society and there are few, if any, legitimate 
representatives or institutions that can fully represent the 
interests and preferences of the citizenry. As one 
respondent wrote, ‘the death of Syrian civil society is in the 
crisis of representation: no matter how many mechanisms 
we put in place to ensure fair representation, there will 
always be those that oppose...’ 
 
Instead, most respondents favoured a selection process 
informed by a set of common principles while also 
reflecting a diversity of opinions, geographies and 
backgrounds over selection criteria based on religion, 
sect or ethnicity. Among participants, as seen in Figure 9, 
civil society legitimacy was largely associated with their 
commitment to human rights and civil society values (84 
per cent) and the ability to articulate the needs and 
priorities of citizens without bias (81 per cent). 
Recognizing the limitations of primarily involving NGOs, 
respondents gave near equal weight to the inclusion of 
prominent individuals (68 per cent) and organized sectors 
of civil society (67 per cent).  
 
Interviews emphasized how the CSSR provides a space 
for Syrian experts, who preferred to remain independent, 
to utilize their technical and subject-matter expertise on 
specific agenda items in a non-political manner, thereby 
promoting productive dialogue and creating the capacity 
for effective analysis of the issues. In one interview, a 
Figure 9: Participants' views on ensuring representation 
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legal expert stated that the CSSR provided him the only 
opportunity to participate in Geneva and have a say in the 
process as political parties would never consider 
someone like him – a view echoed by most participants 
with high technical expertise.  
 
For example, participants explained that selection of 
participants should be based on: 
• ‘Putting public interest above private interests’ 
• ‘Commitment to civil principles that can include 
everyone’ 
• ‘Civil society should have positions regarding 
political decisions and practices but not adopt a 
certain political line (loyalist or opposition for 
example)’ 
• ‘Effectiveness not reach, reach is unconnected to 
effectiveness’ 
 
Indeed, the survey found that the main obstacles that 
impeded the CSSR and the quality of discussions were 
the presence of non-civic actors (66 per cent) and those 
with extreme views (56 per cent). Accordingly, most 
participants preferred that criteria for selecting 
participants should include ‘no military involvement’ (80 
per cent) with more than half (53 per cent) also 
recommending ‘no involvement in a political organization’ 
(as seen in Figure 10).    
 
5.5 Agenda-Setting and Topics for 
Discussion 
 
While the agenda of any dialogue depends on the goals it 
seeks to achieve, the process by which an agenda is 
developed can influence discussions and outcomes. A 
purely fixed and externally-imposed agenda can 
undermine the legitimacy of the dialogue while 
consultative processes for generating agenda items can 
contribute to it. The research found that throughout the 
CSSR process, agenda development and identification of 
topics for discussion were marked with substantial 
differences in opinion among participants, with some 
desiring a fixed agenda and others a broad, more 
participatory approach to agenda development.  
The conveners of the CSSR took a mixed approach, 
distributing a broad agenda prior to the meeting with 
suggested topic items related to the agenda for the 
political talks but also providing space during the first half 
day of each CSSR meeting for agenda restructuring by 
the participants. Indeed, agenda items varied 
considerably at each meeting, and have included, for 
example, detainees; humanitarian work; constitution; 
human rights and transitional justice; institutional reform 
and mechanisms for a democratic transition; as well as 
discussions on how to improve the CSSR itself.  
Participants produced several reports on thematic 
subjects, including on the constitution and human rights, 
to feed into the political process.   
 
When asked what topics they would prefer to discuss, 
most survey respondents indicated preference for a 
broader range of topics than those tackled at the political 
talks.  For example, the survey found that: 
 
• 94 per cent said civic topics 
• 91 per cent said humanitarian issues 
Figure 10: Participants’ views on selection criteria 
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• 48 per cent said political topics 
• and only, 11 per cent stated military topics 
 
5.6 Format and Facilitation: A space for 
dialogue among Syrians 
 
The flexible architecture of the CSSR helped create 
conditions for building trust and reasoned deliberation, 
while also providing a microcosm of the diversity that 
exists within the country. Survey respondents indicated 
that adherence to principles and ground rules that foster 
civility and respect for difference is what makes the CSSR 
different from adversarial debate and back-and-forth 
negotiations.  
 
Constructive facilitation, format design, and the inclusion 
of both Syria experts and those grounded in the 
community was seen as helping create the capacity for 
effective analysis of drivers and solutions as well as forge 
consensus on foundational principles of a peaceful Syria. 
Unlike the Women’s Advisory Board, however, the Civil 
Society Support Room did not have a dedicated, 
professional facilitation team that worked with 
participants over time and could shape ad capture 
change processes. Meetings were at times facilitated by 
Syrian professionals, and at other times, participants 
nominated facilitators from within the group. In some 
interviews, participants suggested that professional 
facilitators with Syrian backgrounds were able to 
constructively move conversation forward and away from 
adversarial debate and stereotype recriminations. Survey 
respondents believed that a dedicated Syrian or Arabic-
speaking facilitator who was low-level but knew the 
nuances of the context would be best placed to 
encourage intra-Syria dialogue (Figure 11).   
 
The basic format desired was plenary sessions bringing 
together the whole group with breakout sessions on 
specific topics running parallel to one another (Figure 12). 
While meetings with external actors was seen as 
beneficial for outreach purposes, their unscheduled 
presence ‘in the room’ was seen as disruptive to their 
internal dialogue. Interviews with participants and 
organizers reveal that participants often preferred the 
room to themselves in order to allow for open and honest 
dialogue without the presence of external actors that can 
change the dynamics of the group.  
 
5.7 Supporting consensus on foundational 
principles and shared values 
 
The value of an intra-Syrian civil society dialogue for 
peacebuilding can be seen in the emphasis that survey 
participants placed on forging consensus on foundational 
principles and shared values over negotiations to resolve 
specific issues. In a context where violence has damaged 
social cohesion and cross-community trust, most 
respondents (72 per cent) believed that the CSSR should 
focus consensus-building on common goals and shared 
values that can create the blueprint for a peace process 
and far-reaching political reform. CSSR participants 
interviewed described how consensus-seeking on 
specific subject items would undermine the diversity of 
opinions and interests, while also creating the potential 
for politicization and backlash towards them. They did 
not claim nor want to be seen as formally representing 
constituencies but felt that they were closest to 
expressing the grievances and aspirations of society. 
Indeed, only a minority – 12 per cent - found it necessary 
Figure 11: Participant's views on format 
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to try and reach consensus on specific subject items 
(Figure 13). As one participant summarized, ‘we should 
be united on values but should also protect the right to be 
different on other issues.’  
 
5.8 Outreach and Education 
 
The CSSR conveners provided opportunities for 
participants to engage with UN actors and relevant 
member states, allowing participants to raise critical 
issues and deepen analysis of local contexts while at 
times, facilitating humanitarian action on the ground 
through the creation of these relationships. Moreover, the 
CSSR organized and designed new outreach 
mechanisms to engage civil society in between meetings 
through regional meetings and video-conferencing in 
hard-to-reach areas as well as assigned interlocutors 
from swisspeace who speak with CSSR members in 
between activities.   
 
At the same time, more attention could have been paid to 
creating mechanisms for outreach, advocacy and support 
across the CSSR process. The lack of such structures 
hindered the ability of the CSSR to widen its impact and 
engage civil society beyond its participants.  At times, 
participants came under attack for their participation or 
collective outputs; situations which, in part, could have 
remedied by better communications and engagement 
around the process. Moreover, only some participants 
communicated the discussions and findings to their own 
networks and communities after participating in the 
CSSR.  
 
6 Where inclusion fails: Kurdish 
representation at the CSSR  
 
The CSSR has suffered from a serious lack of inclusion of 
civil society from the Kurdish-majority region in 
northeastern Syria. The primary challenge has been 
political, mainly Turkish opposition to the inclusion of 
Kurdish participants who are seen as close to or 
sympathisers with the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) 
party in either the political or civil society processes. 
Moreover, organisations operating in Kurdish-held areas 
are hard to reach and have limited representation in both 
Gaziantep and Damascus, because of restrictions 
Figure 13: Participants' views on consensus-seeking 
Figure 12 Participants' views on facilitation 
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imposed by the Turkish and Syrian governments. An 
example of the difficulty of traveling is described in 
another report: ‘the WAB [Women Advisory Board] 
member from a PYD-held area, for example, must cross 
the border illegally, timing her trip during dark nights, and 
then walk for hours to reach Sulaimaniyya in Iraq in order 
to be able to come to Geneva’ (Alzoubi 2014, p.4).   
 
The under-representation of Syrian Kurds in the CSSR 
was widely criticised by the Syrian Kurdish media11  which 
stressed that the absence of these organisations is 
hindering their ability to network and to be aware of what 
is happening in Geneva. In response, the OSE organised 
regional meetings for the CSSR in Erbil in the Kurdish 
Regional Government in Iraq. While this step helped bring 
some Kurdish voices into the CSSR, the issue of 
excluding organisations and activists that are perceived 
to be close to PYD continues, as many of those are 
unable to make it to Erbil. 
 
The LSE research team interviewed eight civil society 
activists, five female and three male, who lead civil 
society groups based in Kurdish-majority areas but that 
also work in eastern Syria in areas newly-liberated from 
the Islamic State. Of the five female activists, two had no 
prior knowledge of the CSSR while two had heard of it but 
never knew of anyone invited from their areas to the 
CSSR or to any other peace-building platform. They had 
been briefed by a Syrian civil society activist that came to 
their area to organize a roundtable and share information 
on the Geneva process, the CSSR and the Women’s 
Advisory Board. The one female activist from the area 
who had participated in the CSSR had been invited once 
and had some limited communications with the OSE.   
All interviewees attributed the marginalization of civil 
society from Kurdish-majority areas to political pressure 
from external actors particularly Turkey. The few Kurds 
allowed to participate in the Geneva processes, especially 
within the political negotiations, are perceived as close to 
Turkey and Turkish interests. They point to the fact that 
these Kurdish representatives refrain from referring to 
violations committed by Turkey inside Syria, especially in 
Afrin, to substantiate and confirm these perceptions of 
bias. Several expressed disappointment with the ‘thin’ 
promises of the US and UN to include Kurdish 
representation, and explained that the exclusion of large 
                                                        
11 See for example: “Persistent absence of Kurdish 
organisations from the CSSR at the Geneva talks”, published 
segments of Kurdish civil society would de-legitimize any 
outcomes achieved in the Geneva process in their 
communities.   
 
In addition to their political exclusion, interviewees also 
believed that their marginalization extended to civic and 
humanitarian spaces, limiting their engagement and 
coordination with UN agencies, international actors, and 
other Syrian civil society spaces. They described civil 
society as not only ‘very far from the political process’ but 
also from ‘the whole humanitarian and development 
mechanisms and platforms.’ They explained how they 
could not usually participate in INGO or donor 
conferences, trainings and workshops, because they are 
often held in Turkey. 
 
This made them sceptical of the prospects of any 
internationally-mediated political process or the influence 
of civil society on the negotiating parties but they still 
believed that their inclusion in the CSSR would be 
valuable. It would provide them the space ‘to connect’ and 
‘break the barriers and stereotypes’ with civil society 
across Syria’s geographically-divided communities and 
international bodies. Some highlighted the opportunity 
that a platform like the CSSR could provide to exchange 
information, learn lessons, share experiences and 
coordinate activities with other Syrian civil society. The 
only one interviewee that attended viewed her experience 
as productive both in networking and engaging a range of 
other Syrian CSOs but also by having the opportunity to 
confront biased ideas from attendees about Kurdish civil 
society, noting how ‘alienation from the political process 
inflates preconceived ideas and social rifts.’  
 
In addition to the direct participation of women and CSOs 
operating in Kurdish-majority areas and eastern Syria in 
the CSSR and wider political process, they recommended 
CSSR consultations with civil society to gather 
community needs, perspectives and ideas to feed into the 
CSSR meetings and de-briefing sessions via 
teleconferencing or meetings in more accessible 
neighbouring countries, like Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon.  
Other communication networks or mechanisms for 
engagement suggested include the establishment of 
focal points and coordinators responsible for maintaining 
ongoing communication and coordination with 
by ROK on 16-8-2017, available at: http://www.rok-
online.com/?p=7447 
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humanitarian and development organizations. Most 
importantly, however, they called for political courage by 
the UN and other international actors to withstand 
Turkish pressure to exclude Kurdish representation and 
influence over the political process.   
 
7 Reflections and Recommendations 
 
The goal of our research was to gain insight into the 
Syrian Civil Society Support Room from the perspective 
of its participants, and to elicit their ideas on how to 
improve its design moving forward. Specifically, it sought 
to explore the impact that participation in the CSSR has 
had not only on the political process but also on civil 
society itself. The research finds that the CSSR took an 
innovative approach that allowed it to respond to and 
develop with each round of meetings to take its current 
shape. While it could benefit from further improvements 
to its design, the CSSR has still had multiple positive 
impacts. The findings highlight several issues with 
important implications when thinking about the value of 
civil society inclusion and how best to design a process 
that can most optimize its impact. 
 
Firstly, the inclusion of civil society in peace-making 
should not be seen as simply a matter of principle given 
its realpolitik consequences. Conflicts and the processes 
that seek to resolve them have multiple levels and 
interweaving strands that tend to reinforce one another. 
Building consensus and peace in highly divided societies 
is a dynamic process that moves backwards and 
forwards. The CSSR became a space for civil society 
actors from different backgrounds, geographies, and 
perspectives to challenge themselves and the dominant 
narratives that sustain conflict and shape international 
action. Their collective experience of coming together 
despite deep mistrust and difference of opinions, and 
building consensus on shared values and principles that 
could underpin a future Syria could be described as form 
of ‘pre-figurative politics’ or reimagining of the social 
contract. Strengthening the capacities of civil society to 
bridge divides and engage in productive dialogue and 
collaborate action make it paramount to include them 
from day one in any peace-making effort.    
 
Secondly and related, the CSSR demonstrates that 
structures to include civil society in peace-making should 
not be seen as simply complementary or an add-on to 
elite negotiations. Civil society processes have their own 
value and positive peacebuilding impacts. When thinking 
about designing an inclusive mechanism, it is important 
to note that involving civil society is not simply about 
giving voice to citizens or sourcing different perspectives 
through one-directional methods and platforms, for 
example, public hearings, web-based tools or portals, and 
so forth. The value of civil society engagement lies in the 
impact that informed dialogue, deliberation and face-to-
face interactions can have on re-articulating conflict 
narratives, fostering connections and building a shared 
vision for the future.   
When designed appropriately, civil society processes can: 
 
• Build coalitions among diverse actors based on 
normative and strategic arguments 
• Forge consensus on foundational principles that 
can underpin a legitimate settlement and align 
stakeholders behind the public interest 
• Deepen understanding and attention to the 
underlying drivers of conflict, and how the 
conflict has mutated over time through violence 
and strategic use of sectarian narratives 
• Create the conditions to make the voices of 
citizens and marginalized communities heard  
• Reshape conflict narratives and discourses 
among the participants themselves and those in 
charge of resolving the conflict  
While negotiations to end active hostilities may ultimately 
require a relatively small group of actors wielding raw 
power, larger discussions about the future direction of a 
country and expanding political and economic 
opportunities require a more diverse group of 
stakeholders. The survey findings support the 
conclusions of other studies that civic inclusion 
processes can create new opportunities for citizen 
engagement, allowing multiple perspectives to develop a 
shared vision, shape priorities, generate agenda items 
and potentially legitimize an agreement. Most 
importantly, such processes can help to address the 
original drivers of the conflict (e.g. issues of political 
reform and justice) and to reverse the conditions 
generated by violence that serves to sustain the power of 
political and military actors (e.g. sectarianism, low social 
trust, etc.).  
 
Thirdly, civil society inclusion can help support the work 
of mediators and signpost the way forward on key issues 
26         A process in its own right 
 
by presenting a microcosm of society and the 
possibilities for consensus-building and areas of 
agreement. In contrast to the negotiating parties, the 
CSSR exposed the readiness of Syrian civilians to engage 
with those with opposing views and connect across 
conflict lines. The fact that the most important factors 
highlighted by Syrian participants were commitment to 
human rights and justice over sect and identity 
demonstrates its future potential to push negotiating 
parties to moderate their positions and/or address the 
issues most important to citizens. At early stages of 
peace-making processes, for example in the cases of 
Northern Ireland and Guatemala, civil society has helped 
identify root causes, generate agenda items and create 
momentum for peace even when the political level has 
stalled.    
 
Finally, design matters in generating a sense of 
ownership, legitimizing the role of civil society, and 
producing positive outcomes. The issue of mandate, 
timing and how it relates to the political process raises 
questions on how various elements in a political process 
are interpreted and sequenced. Civil society must be 
closely linked to official processes to elevate the role of 
civil society and its outputs. The research findings also 
suggest that designers should adopt a broad conception 
of civil society that goes beyond NGOs and the formally 
organized sectors of civil society to include prominent 
community figures, intellectuals and experts. In Syria, a 
key question is how to preserve and build a pluralistic 
democratic Syria where citizens from all backgrounds 
feel included and protected. While selection of 
participants should aim to be inclusive and diverse, a 
focus on those grounded in communities and willing to 
engage across conflict-lines can prepare the intellectual 
ground, bolster the ‘moderate middle’, and better express 
the voices of citizens.  
 
Key takeaways and recommendations 
In response to the insights generated from the research, 
we have developed two sets of recommendations. The 
first set of recommendations relates to civil society 
inclusion in peace-making processes in any conflict-
affected contexts while the second set is specific to the 
Syrian CSSR and context.   
 
Key findings and recommendations on civil society 
inclusion in peace-making process 
 
1. From the very start of any peace-making initiative, 
formally mandate and design a civil society track 
that is linked to official negotiation processes but is 
valued as a process in its own right. Process impacts 
may be difficult to measure but they often have wider 
change impacts than originally intended and can 
support longer-term transformative processes.         
 
2. Understand how civil society inclusion can support 
the work of mediators and negotiators by 
signposting the way forward, potentially creating 
political dynamics that obliges conflict parties to 
account for their positions, and by empowering the 
mediator with a third countervailing narrative to 
break the monopoly of narratives.   
 
3. Capitalize on the ability of inclusion mechanisms to 
increase connectivity between policy level and 
grassroots levels, deepening analysis of the 
changing dynamics and perceptions that can affect 
the prospects for peace-making while also 
facilitating humanitarian action.    
 
4. When designing inclusion mechanisms, start with a 
broad conception of civil society and extend support 
and inclusion beyond NGOs and formally constituted 
organizations. It is also an ideal platform to include 
those with technical and subject-matter expertise in 
the country in order to feed into effective analyses of 
the issues in the political process while also 
promoting productive dialogue on substantive topics.  
 
5. Develop flexible and iterative processes that involve 
the participants in design, agenda development, and 
public outreach. This can help promote a sense of 
collective ownership, transparency and improve the 
prospects of the process contributing to a larger 
national consensus on the war forward.   
 
 
Key findings and recommendations regarding the Syrian 
Civil Society Support Room  
 
1. The CSSR has had multiple positive impacts across 
different levels that will affect the prospects of peace 
in Syria and should therefore continue as a key 
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element of a broader political process. It is important 
to build and capitalize on the valuable achievements 
of the CSSR, this will help:   
a. increase the peacebuilding impact of a space for 
dialogue among civic actors across social, 
ethnic and geographic divides to jointly analyse 
realities and rearticulate them, engage in 
collective problem-solving, and build consensus 
on shared principles and directions forward, 
b. support the role of the UN Special Envoy in 
mediation, 
c. facilitate conflict analysis and humanitarian 
action on the ground.  
 
2. The meetings and activities of the CSS should not be 
limited to running concurrently with political talks. 
Limiting the CSSR activities only to the political talks 
created huge discontinuities in the room, and 
reduced the potential cumulative impact of its 
dialogues and activities.   
 
3. There is a need for a stronger mandate for the 
inclusion of women and civil society through a UN 
Security Council Resolution, one that can provide for 
a mechanism akin to a track II process, to allow it to 
meet more frequently and develop a longer-term 
approach that can build on achievements and meet 
the varied objectives desired by civil society.  
 
4. Reinforcing and scaling up the participation of civil 
society in the CSSR can help combat or balance the 
geopolitical rivalries and extensive forces to meet 
demands for a Syrian-led solution and support 
locally-led approaches to peace. 
 
5. The CSSR should provide input into a constitutional 
committee, if established, given its ability to promote 
consensus-building on foundational issues, which 
will be needed to underpin any constitutional 
process. The CSSR can be seen as a mechanism to 
widen participation in the constitutional process. 
 
6. Given the value that all participants placed on the 
CSSR for the opportunity it provided to create an 
inclusive civic framework to shape the future of 
Syria, it is important to leverage the CSSR and invest 
in its potential to provide the foundation or backbone 
for a larger national dialogue process. 
 
7. Aligning the participation criteria to the selection 
priorities chosen by participants can help undermine 
the sectarian narratives that inform and shape the 
conflict and international responses. These priorities 
are commitment to human rights, and the ability to 
express the priorities of civilians. The least important 
criteria they cited was sectarian and ethnic identity.  
 
8. To widen the impact of the CSSR, create and support 
mechanisms to ensure improved outreach and 
transparency. 
 
9. More efforts are needed to improve on inclusivity 
including having wider representation in the CSSR 
from the Kurdish Syrian civil society.  
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